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Abstract
Migration is sometimes seen as a panacea to circumvent the nancial prob-
lems associated to ageing societies. Other authors, however, see it as a burden,
because the arrival of migrant workers can depress the wage of non-educated na-
tives and reduce the economys average productivity. In this paper, we analyze
the e¤ect of migration on workersproductivity and the wage gap. We construct
a life-cycle model with endogenous educational choices and health investment.
Our results point out that, when human capital investment over the life cycle is
possible, migration does not universally increase the wage gap, this depends on
the economys initial conditions.
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1 Introduction
The challenges faced by the European economies will grow over the next decades as
improvements in human longevity contribute to a signicant increase in the propor-
tion of aged population. According to Eurostat projections, the EU27 population is
projected to continue to grow older, with the share of the population aged 65 years
and over rising from a 17.1% in 2008 to 30.0% in 2060 (Table 1). Moreover, the
share of the population belonging to the oldest groups is also projected to increase
considerably; those aged 80 and over are expected to rise from 4.4% to 12.1% over
the same period.
One of the main implications of this aging process is the negative e¤ect that
the increase of dependency ratios has on the viability of the current pay-as-you-
go pension systems (that is, wether the programs begin to pay out more than are
bringing in).1 In fact, the e¤ect of ageing on pensions has been, and will continue
to be, a subject of intense academic research. There is a consensus in the literature
that the demographic transition will make the current pensions systems of most
European countries unsustainable in the long-term. This fact has recently lead to
the introduction of social security system reforms, mostly by delaying the (standard)
retirement age.
Together with the ageing process, immigration ows towards European countries
have been also increasing in recent decades. As longevity increases and fertility re-
mains steady below replacement rates, positive net migration has become the only
population growth factor in many EU countries. Consequently, migration has been
lately regarded as positive by governments: the entry of young and middle age immi-
grant would increase working population which may help to mitigate the European
problems associated to an ageing society.
Nevertheless, the net contribution of migration may be quite modest (Borjas
(1995), Feldstein (2006)). First, the average productivity of a migrant is lower than
the native as a consequence of less years of education on average, because of non
1 In addition, public pension schemes are severely a¤ected by the current nancial and economic
crisis. Under proportional and progressive scheemes, high unemployment and lower earnings is
reducing the contribution to pensions systems exacerbating the problem due to aging.
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recognized educational credentials or just due to cultural distance. As the average
immigrant has lower salary, the contributions she makes are less than those of an
average native, especially under very progressive tax systems (as in EU). Second,
migrants are also consumers of government benets (especially health and education).
Evidence of the US suggests that the immigrants are greater consumer of public
assistance, since the immigrant household is greater and poorest on average than the
native one, what makes them eligible for social benets (Borjas and Hinton (1996)).
Even more important, is that migration may only be a temporary solution, since
the immigrant population would also become old and would eventually become ben-
eciary of the system as well2 Storesletten (2000) calibrates an OLG model for the
US economy and concludes that the e¤ect of immigrants in sustaining social security
varies with their age (and skills). According to his predictions, migration has a posi-
tive e¤ect only if migration policy is directed to middle aged high skilled immigrants.
This is in contrast with the prior views of Smith and Edmonston (1996) and
Lee and Miller (2000) who nd that positive e¤ects for the economy are higher if
immigrants are younger. For the case of Europe, employing generational accounting
methods Bonin et al. (2000) and Collado et al. (2004), nd that increasing the
number of immigrants reduce the nancial burden for future natives in Germany
and Spain, respectively. Recently, Gonzalez et al. (2009) also make use of an OLG
model. In their study, they use demographic and immigration projections from the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) to understand the impact of immigration on
the Spanish pension system. They also simulate the full labor history of di¤erent
workers (di¤ering by age, gender, skill and nationality). Their ndings show that
(with current projections) immigration will not su¢ ce to balance the Spanish pension
system even under complete assimilation of immigrants (in terms of their revenues
and contributions to social security). They may provide, however, additional time to
undertake the necessary reforms.
Besides their roll as tax-payers, immigrants also have changed labor markets.
Since migration represents an increasing share of the labor force, the mix of skills,
2Although some may return to their country of origin before elegibility for social security benets.
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education and productivity in the economy is increasingly determined by the skills,
education and productivity of the foreign born population. A very large amount
of the literature has focused in analyzing the impact of immigrants on the wages
of natives.3 Immigration will a¤ect the wage inequality among natives if the skill
distribution of immigrants di¤ers from that of natives. The basic argument here
is that since the average immigrant is less skilled than the native, migration would
reduce a countrys average productivity and also in a standard text-book model 
reduce the wages of the unskilled native workers (or in economies subject to rigidities,
as in Europe, an increase the unskilled unemployment).
Although there is some empirical evidence that this is the case for the US (Borjas
(2003), empirical studies for Europe show little or null evidence of any impact of mi-
gration on wages4. Among of the possible explanations of this fact, it has been argued
that immigrant and native workers are not perfect substitutes, so that an increase of
immigrant workers do not have to depress the wages of the native (Octaviano and
Peri (2008)). Together with the wage premium, migration may also impact the ac-
cumulation of human capital. Since incentives to complete education are inuenced
by the wage structure, immigration may increase the price of human capital and, in
particular, nativeshigh school educational attainment (Betts 1998, Hunt 2011).
Since the benet from migration for the receiving (aged) economy depends on
the impact of migration on countrys productivity, we believe that it is essential to
understand jointly the roll of migration on both the labor market and human capital
formation. Previous literature has mainly ignored the impact of migration on the
incentives to acquire skills.5 Although the assumptions of variable wages but xed
skill premium (Storesletten (2000)) introduce a link between migration and labor
market outcomes (might well increase interest rates and decrease wages, due to the
3See for instance the surveys of Borjas (1994), (1999) Friedberg and Hunt (1995) or Card (2005))
4See Pischke&Velling (1997) for Germany, Zorlu&Hartog (2005) for the Netherlands and Norway,
Dustmann et al. (2005)for the U.K. and Carrasco et al. (2008) for Spain.
5A noticeable exception may be found in Casarico and the Villanova (2003) who employ a theo-
retical model to analyze the e¤ect of an unskilled migration shock when skill and unskilled workers
are not perfect substitutes. The authors nd that the unskilled migration shock modies schooling
premium and increases the incentives of natives to undertake more schooling. Thus, although in their
setting migration helps to sustain social security, the arrival of migrants has strong redistributive
e¤ects.
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increase in the labor/capital ratio), migration has the same e¤ect on both skilled
and unskilled workers. This is not satisfactory since migration is more likely to hit
unskilled natives stronger and to increase the wage premium.
We depart from the existent literature by considering the interaction between
this two e¤ects. In order to do so, we analyze migration in a small open economy
overlapping generation model (OLG) with an endogenous human capital formation
technology (Ben-Porath (1969), Cunha and Heckman, (2007)). were individuals can
invest in human and physical capital in the di¤erent periods of their lives. The
importance of jointly modeling labor supply and human capital decisions was already
stressed by Becker (1967). Furthermore, by allowing individuals to undertake human
capital investments at adult stages (health investments and/or on-the job-training)
they can compensate human capital depreciation when old.
This is of capital importance when one has in mind policy reforms a¤ecting the
(standard) retirement age. There is an agreement in the neuroscience literature than
both health and mental training play an important role in diminishing the e¤ects
of physical and cognitive decline (Bosworth and Schaie (1997)), Adam et al. (2006),
Scarmeas (2003)) or Stern (2002),(2003) ). Furthermore, given that these investments
may also be undertaken by the current immigrant population (even if assumed to be
unskilled), a migration shock may increase the incentives to acquire human capital
for the immigrant group as well. The model allows us to shed some light over a
broad set of important questions concerning migration, productivity and aging and
the relation among them. (a) The skill and age composition of the labor force and
the evolution of the skill premium; (b) Nativeseducation choice and human capital
investments.
Our results suggest that, as expected, a massive entry of young unskilled migrant
workers initially increases the wage premium and hence also the share of educated
native workers. However, if human capital investment is possible at adult stages, it
is no longer true that the nal wage premium has necessarily to increase, as stated
by the previous literature. The total impact of unskilled migration on the wage
premium (and the economy as a whole), ultimately depends on the initial average
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productivity of an educated versus an non-educated worker, and not only on the
fraction of educated versus non-educated workers. This result is of importance for the
Policy Maker, since implies that the attitude towards migration (from a destination
country viewpoint) depends on the particular country and should not be based on a
general receipt. An increase of the normal retirement age leads to similar conclusions.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 review some facts
concerning migration towards European countries. The model is presented in section
3. Equilibrium results may be found in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Some facts about EU migration
From being traditional countries of emigration, many European countries have be-
come a destination for international migration. According to Eurostat, in 2009 around
31.9 million people in EU27 are foreign citizens, representing a 6.4 percent of total
EU27 population, being 4 percent citizens of countries outside EU27 (see Table 2).
Although foreign born residents represent a sizable part of total UE population, the
numbers are still far from those of traditional migration countries: US, Canada and
Australia have bigger shares of foreign born population (12 percent, 20 percent and
24 percent, respectively). Detailed statistics for each country may also be found in
Table 2. Germany accounts for the biggest number of foreign citizenship, followed by
Spain, UK and France. But Luxembourg is the country with the largest fraction of
immigrants with respect to total population, although most of them are UE citizens.
Concerning the nationalities of the EU immigrants, in 2009 around 40 percent
of foreign EU27 residents are citizens of another EU27 state. Considering a wider
Europe (including Turkey), more than a third of immigrants come from non-UE27
countries, followed by Africa, Asia and (Latin) America.
Recent migration ow data show that Migration towards EU has decelerated in
recent years, mostly as a consequence of the strong crisis hitting European countries.
During 2009, about 3.0 million people immigrated into one of the EU Member States,
while at least 1.9 million emigrants were reported to have left an EU Member State.
UK, Spain and Italy reported the largest number of immigrants in 2009, but also the
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highest number of emigrants. Although most of EU Member States reported more
immigration than emigration in 2009, Ireland, Malta and the three Baltic Member
States already presented negative net migration balances.
The prole of the EU immigrant is a younger and less skilled individual than the
average native. Foreign citizens living in the EU27 were signicantly younger than
the population of nationals with median age of 34.4 years compared with the 40.4
years of age for a native. Age di¤erences between foreign and native populations are
better understood by looking at population pyramids (Fig. 3). As a consequence,
immigration has slowed down population aging in European countries. Nevertheless,
medium and long term projections continue to forecast a considerable aging process.
No particular e¤ort has been done by EU countries to attract high skilled people
until recent dates. In 2000, 55 percent of foreign born population in the former EU15
was estimated to have less than secondary education. The average immigrant in
EU has less years of education than the EU native. As Figure 4 shows, this number
contrasts with the foreign born adults in North America (U.S. and Canada) who have,
on average, more years of schooling. Table 3 presents the percentage of working age
population by place of birth, level of education (Low, Medium and High) and country
of residence, using data from the European Labor Force Survey (LFS), as it appears
in Münz (2008). As Table 3 shows, some countries are better attracting high skill
immigrants than others. For example, Ireland, Denmark and Estonia have a sizable
proportion of high skilled adult foreign born population. In contrast, other countries
as Portugal, France, Austria or Spain had mostly attracted low skilled workers.
3 The Model
Consider a small open developed economy with free capital ows and labor inows,
there is no emigration of native population. The economy is populated by two-
period overlapping generations of individuals, where population growth and survival
probabilities are exogenous.6 Each period there is an exogenous inow of foreign
youngindividuals. All agents, foreign and native, are endowed with a unit of time
6We can think of young generations of wokers aged between15 and 55, and old generations aged
between 55 and 95.
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in each period, they dont value leisure and only care about consumption when old.
During the rst period of live a young native works as a low skill worker and has to
decide whether she wants to become a high skill worker. If she does, a fraction of
her time endowment eH has to be allocated to education, this fraction will depend
on an idiosyncratic ability/e¤ort which follows a uniform distribution on the interval
[0; 1]. If she becomes a high skill worker, she will o¤er h > 1 units of e¢ ciency labor,
otherwise her supply will be just 1 e¢ ciency unit: During the rst period she can also
undertake health investment (or on the job training) to mitigate her human capital
depreciation when old. An agent will survive to old age with probability s, during this
period she will work until some xed (legal) point in time and the rest of the period
will enjoy retirement time. Young immigrants cannot get involved in education when
they arrive, so they cannot work as high skill workers, but they can invest in health
(job training). All children born in the receiving country are considered natives, so
children of immigrants behave as natives and can become skilled workers. All markets
are competitive.
3.1 Technology
The nal goods production technology of the representative rm is
Yt = AK

t Q
1 
t (1)
Qt = (L

t + H

t )
1= (2)
where Yt is output, Kt is physical capital and Qt e¢ ciency units of labor. Lt and
Ht are low and high skill labor, respectively, both measured in units of e¢ ciency. To
work as skilled a worker needs a diploma that can be obtained during young age.
The assumption of a small open economy and free capital ows implies that:
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Kt =

A
r
1=(1 )
Qt;
wLt = (r) (1 + x

t )
(1 )=
;
wHt = (r) (1 + x

t )
(1 )=
x 1t ;
where  (r) = (1  )A  Ar =(1 ) and r is the worlds interest rate, wit is the wage
of i skill labor, and xt = Ht=Lt is the ratio of high skill labor to low skill labor.
Note that the skill premium implied by this type of technology satises the following
condition:
wHt
wLt
= x 1t : (3)
3.2 Demographics
Let Njt and Mjt be the number of natives and immigrants of age j in period t,
respectively. Each young individual gives birth to a xed number of children at the
beginning of adult age. Assuming that individuals only migrate when young, that
children of immigrants become natives when young, and that there is no return to
the origin country, the number of natives at the beginning of period t is
N1t = (1 + n)N1t 1 + (1 +m)M1t 1; t = 0; 1; 2; ::given Nj0; Mj0 > 0; j = 1; 2; 3:
(4)
where n andm represent the exogenous fertility rates of natives and migrants, respec-
tively. Assuming the probability of survival from adult to old is the same for natives
and migrants (this assumption plays no role in the present setup), total number of
natives and immigrants in period t are respectively:
Nt = N1t + sN2t;
Mt = M1t + sM2t:
Note that M2t =M1t 1 is the exogenous inow of migrants in period t  1.
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3.3 Households
We assume that all natives and immigrants have the same logarithmic preferences
on future consumption and dont value leisure. Thus, all labor income net of taxes
and transfers will nance nancial assets and health investment. Retirement age is
exogenous and xed by the government, so when old an agent works a xed fraction of
time l and during the rest (1  l) perceives a pension benet and enjoys retirement.
The only di¤erence between the problem of a native and an immigrant is that the
latter cannot go to school when young (arrival date) and/or that education in the
origin country is not recognized.
3.3.1 Natives
In the rst period a native has to decide if she goes to college, ei 2 eH = e; eL = 0	.
An agent has ability e to learn, which is continuously and uniformly distributed on
the interval [0; 1]. If she goes to college, she will supply (1  e)h e¢ ciency units of
high skill labor during the rst period. If not, she will supply 1 e¢ ciency unit of low
skill labor. Moreover, if she invests in health, she can inuence her future human
capital as follows:
hi2t+1 =
 
1    Iithi1t;   Iit+1 =  D + Iit+1 1 ; D > 1;
with hi1t = h if i = H; h
i
1t = 1 if i = L:
The budget constraints when young and old of a native agent born in period t
are, respectively:
Iit + a
i
2t+1 = (1  )
 
1  eiwithi1t + bt
ci2t+1 = (1  ) lwit+1hi2t+1 + (1 + r) ai2t+1 + pt+1 (1  l)
Given the choice of ei, the problem of a native with skill i will be
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max
Iit ; c
i
2t+1
s

log ci2t+1 + log (1  l)
	
s:t: Iit +
ci2t+1
1 + r
= (1  )  1  eiwithi1t + bt + (1  ) lwit+1hi2t+1 + pt+1 (1  l)1 + r
Substituting consumption into the utility function we nd that the optimal amount
of health investment is
Iit =

(1  ) lwit+1hi1t
1 + r
1=2
 D: (5)
Then we can compute the lifetime income left for consumption for each case,
eH = e and eL = 0, and conclude that an agent will choose to go to college if and
only if
 
1  eHwHt h  wLt +
24 l  wHt+1h  wLt+1
1 + r
+ 2
l1=2
 
wHt+1h
1=2    wLt+11=2
((1 + r) (1  ))1=2
35
(6)
The agent with e¤ort ability et for which this condition holds with equality will
determine the fraction of young native workers N1t that decide to go to college, where
et will be a function of current and future wages.
3.3.2 Immigrants
Immigrants are young workers at the time of their arrival. The di¤erence between
young natives and young immigrants is that the latter, independently of whether
they went to college or not in their country of origin, cannot get the domestic college
diploma that entitles them to work as high skill workers. Thus, the only decisions
they have to take when young are those related to health investment. So (5) with
i = L represents also the solution to the problem of a representative immigrant agent.
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Figure 1: The labor market equilibrium
4 Equilibrium
At the beginning of each period, the stock of physical capital Kt is given. From the
rmsoptimally conditions, equation (3), it follows that the ratio of high skill to low
skill labor can be written from the demand side as

wHt
wLt
1= 1
= xdt (7)
Moreover, solving for the demand functions of low skill and high skill workers and
solving for wages it follows that
wLt =
(r)
1  

wHt

=( 1)(1 )=  '  wHt  ; '0  wHt  < 0: (8)
Next we compute the labor supplies of each type and compute the ratio of high
skill to low skill labor, both measured in e¢ ciency units. Since we have assumed a
uniform distribution for e¤ort on the unit interval, it follows from (6) that etN1t will
be the number of young high skill workers in period t, and hetN1t
R et
0 (1  e) de the
number of e¢ ciency units supplied by them.
So the supply of high skill labor in e¢ ciency units is
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Hst = N
H
1t h
Z et
0
(1  e) de+ sNH1t 1lhH2t (9)
where N ijt is the amount of native workers of type i with age j in period t, and N
H
1t =
etN1t: Thus, the number of high skill workers in adult age in period t are those that
went to college when young in period t  1; which is predetermined at period t. But
hH2t depends on the current wage wHt . This follows from (5): hH2t =
 
1    IHt 1h,
with 
 
IHt 1

=

(1 )wHt lh
1+r
 1=2
:
On the other side the supply of low skill labor measured in e¢ ciency units is
Lst =
 
M1t + sl
M2thL2t

+ (1  et )N1t + sl
 
1  et 1

N1t 1hL2t ; (10)
where the rst term in brackets accounts for the labor supply of immigrants. Note
that the e¢ ciency units supplied when old by an immigrant and a native are the
same. In the case of low skill workers (5) implies that hL2t =
 
1    ILt 1 ; with

 
ILt 1

=

(1 )wLt l
1+r
 1=2
:
Finally, dividing (9) by (10) we can obtain the ratio of high skill to low skill labor
from the supply side:
xst =
(1  et =2) e2t N1th+ slet 1N1t 1hH2t 
M1t + slM2thL2t

+ (1  et )N1t + sl
 
1  et 1

N1t 1hL2t
(11)
At time t the old population with high skill is given, et 1; so equating expressions
(7) and (11), and taking into account (8) we can solve for the current wage wHt as a
function of the future wHt+1:Thus, given the future wage, we can obtain the equilibrium
values wH

t and x

t : Figure 1 illustrates this equilibrium point.
Suppose that initially the economy is in equilibrium and there is no migration.
An inow of immigrants will shift the schedule xst in Figure 1 to the left. This will
cause initially an increase in the skill premium, but it will also trigger an adjustment
in the young native population going to college, et will increase and this will in turn
a¤ect the position of xst . The e¤ect of e

t on x
s
t is ambiguous and will depend on the
initial composition of the labor force. For a relatively large xt an increase in et will
shift xst to the right, smoothing the e¤ect of the initial shock. But if the economy
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is initially relatively abundant in low skill labor, the increase in et can decrease xt
further.
Increases in the legal retirement age l has an ambiguous e¤ect on et . On the
one hand it will increase the supply of time which increases the return from working
as high skill , but on the other implies larger health investment. Moreover, increases
in l will rise both the supplies of high skill and low skill labor and so it will have
an ambiguous e¤ect on xst , which again will depend on the initial composition of the
labor force. The e¤ect of a change in the survival probability is similar to that of l,
but it has no e¤ect on the amount of health investment.
5 Conclusion
Migration is one of the main challenges that Europe is facing, but its e¤ect on the
economy are not well understood. For example, sometimes migration is seen as a
panacea to circumvent the nancial problems associated to ageing societies, some-
times as a burden, since the arrival of migrant workers can depress the wage of (non-
educated) natives and reduce the average productivity of the economy as a whole. In
this paper, we have focused on the e¤ect of migration on workersproductivity and
the wage gap between skill and unskilled workers.
In order to shed some light on the e¤ect of migration on ageing receiving economies
we have constructed a two period OLG model where we have made explicit both edu-
cational choices and human capital investments. Endogeneity of educational choices
is of key importance since the arrival of migrant young workers is more likely to
depress the wage of non-educated natives (as they are more close substitutes) and
hence to increase the incentives to schooling. Also, as evidenced by the biological
literature, individual life cycles are inuenced by health investment and maintenance
practices.
The conclusion is that the evolution of human capital during the life cycle is badly
described by existent theories that treat depreciation or, for our purposes, aging as
purely exogenous. Our results point out that, when human capital investment over
the life cycle is possible, migration does not universally increase the wage gap. This
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depends on the economys initial conditions, and needs to be studied case by case.
We do not claim that the e¤ects we discuss are always relevant, nor that they provide
the unique or even main driving forces. To address these issues additional studies
featuring, for example, a detailed pay-as-you-go system and general equilibrium ef-
fects on capital accumulation are required. We leave these questions open for future
research.
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Fig.1 Citizens of non-member countries resident in the EU-27 by continent of 
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Fig.2 Main countries of origin of non-nationals, EU-27, 2010 
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Fig.3 Age structure of the national and non-national populations, EU, 2010 
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Fig.4 Adult migrants in OECD Europe and North America, by skill level 
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